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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
out unreservedly engrafting upon the Code such concepts as will




The North Carolina Supreme Court recently reconsidered its
position regarding privileged confidential communications between
husband and wife.1 In Hicks v. Hicks,' the wife had instituted a
suit under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1967),'
for the custody of their eight-year-old daughter, for maintenance
and support for her and the child, and for counsel fees. The trial
record reveals that the husband had installed a tape recorder in the
basement of the home. There was no evidence that the wife knew
of the tape recorder. On three different occasions, in the presence of
their eight-year-old child, conversations between the husband and
wife were recorded. The opinion does not disclose what was said on
"See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 206 (1917):
The legal relations consequent upon offer and acceptance are not wholly
dependent, even upon the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of
the parties. The law determines these relations in the light of subsequent
circumstances, these often being totally unforeseen by the parties. In
such cases it is sometimes said that the law will create that relation which
the parties would have intended had they foreseen. The fact is, however,
that the decision will depend upon the notions of the court as to policy,
welfare, justice, right and wrong, such notions being inarticulate and
subconscious.
1 Common law developed four distinct rules regarding testimony between
husband and wife. These rules have not always been kept separate in legal
writings. These four categories are: (1) one spouse could not testify in
the other's behalf (2) one spouse could not testify against the other (3) one
spouse could not testify about confidential communications with the other(4) neither spouse could testify to nonaccess so as to basterdize a child
conceived or born during the marriage. See generally J. MAGUiRE, EVIDENCE,
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 78-101 (1947); D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 53-61 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANs-
nURY]; 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285-87, 2332-41 (McNaughton rev.
1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] ; Comment, Evidentiary Privileges and
Incompetencies of Hitsband and Wife, 4 ARK. L. REv. 426 (1950).
271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967).3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1967) provides for alimony without
divorce and for custody of any children of the marriage. This section con-
cerns support and not divorce. Shore v. Shore, 220 N.C. 802, 18 S.E.2d 353
(1942).
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these occasions, but did indicate that the wife "used vile and profane
language in respect to her husband."4 The trial judge remarked to
the jury "'there was a pretty ugly conversation in the presence of
that little girl.' "5 On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court
was asked to determine whether the recordings were admissible in
evidence. The court held the recordings inadmissible due to the
privileged communications rule and ordered a new trial.
The court was faced initially with the admissibility of the sound
recording itself.' The great weight of authority,' which the court
followed,' holds that evidence offered in the form of a sound re-
cording is not inadmissible because of that form, if properly authen-
ticated9 and if not excluded by some positive rule of law because
of the subject matter. As early as 1936, a Pennsylvania court per-
ceived that the phonograph, the dictaphone, the talking motion pic-
ture, and other recording devices were in such common use that the
verity of their recording and reproduction of sounds was well estab-
lished. Thus, the court could permit their use as a means of present-
ing evidentiary facts to the jury.'0
' 271 N.C. 204, 206, 155 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1967).
rId. at 207, 155 S.E.2d at 802.
'See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958).
7Id. at 1029-30.
8271 N.C. 204, 205, 155 S.E.2d 799, 800 (1967).
Sound recordings have almost universal approval as an acceptable form
of evidence; this is premised upon a proper foundation initially established
for their admission. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024, 1032-36 (1958). See, e.g.,
Williams v. State, 226 P.2d 989 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951), which lays down
seven requirements for a proper foundation.
.. Commonwealth v. Clark. 123 Pa. Super. 277, 187 A. 237 (1936). As
to the use of recordings containing privileged communications between
spouses, see Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A.2d 401 (1951) (in a
divorce proceeding it was error to admit into evidence a wire recording of con-
versations between spouses since confidential communications between spouses
cannot be divulged by either spouse without the consent of the other). Ac-
cord, People v. Buckowski, 37 Cal. 2d 629, 233 P.2d 912 (1951); Braun v.
Braun, 31 Wash. 2d 468, 197 P.2d 442 (1948). B.tt see State v. Slater, 36
Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950) (a criminal case where the admission
in evidence of a wire recording of a confidential communication between
spouses, simultaneously overheard by a third person, a police officer, was ap-
parently upheld on the ground that an eavesdropper is unaffected by the rule
of privilege. In earlier North Carolina cases tape recordings and television
recordings were allowed in evidence). State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112
S.E.2d 61 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832 (1960) (a criminal conspiracy
case in which a tape recording was offered in evidence in corroboration of
the witness who had testified regarding those matters on the tape); State
v. Knight, 261 N.C. 17, 134 S.E.2d 101 (1964) (recognizing admissibility of
a television recording for impeachment purposes). For information on the
[Vol. 46
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The court then concerned itself with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-56
(Supp. 1967), which expressly provides: "No husband or wife shall
be compellable to disclose any confidential communication made by
one to the other during their marriage."" This statute presents
various problems when it is applied to the present fact situation.
Essentially the court must decide three issues: (1) who has the
privilege and who may waive it; (2) whether the presence of a
third person destroys the privilege even though the third person is
a child and member of the family; and (3) whether the presence of
the third person destroys the privilege in toto so that either spouse
may testify or destroys it only to the extent that the third person
alone may testify.
The marital privilege of confidential communications is to be dis-
tinguished from rules disqualifying witnesses as unreliable and from
rules, e.g., the hearsay rule, excluding evidence because of lack of
trustworthiness or because of its prejudicial effect. The rule of
privilege shuts out probative evidence as a matter of policy in recog-
nition of the desirability of protecting certain human relationships,
even at the expense of the judicial investigation of truth. 2 The
social gain to be fostered is absolute confidence between spouses.
use of motion pictures, see Annot., 129 A.L.R. 361 (1940); Annot., 83 A.L.R.
1351 (1933).
" A partial bibliography of materials treating privileged communications
between husband and wife follows: STANSBURY § 60; R. WEINBERG, CONFI-
DENTIAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS 26-30 (1967); WIG-
MORE §§ 2332-41; Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon, 36 ORE.
L. PEv. 132 (1957); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Ttn. L. REv. 101 (1956); McCor-
mick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEx. L. ZEv. 447
(1938); Platz, A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin? Various Privileges, 1945
WlTs. L. Rav. 239; Quick, Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
26 U. CIN. L. REv. 537, 550 (1957); Symposium on the Oklahoma Law of
Evidence-Confidential Communications Between Spouses, 5 OXLA. L. REv.
291, 311 (1952); Comment, Evidentiary Privileges and Incompetencies of
Husband and Wife, 4 Ajx. L. REV. 426, 429-32 (1950) ; Note, Spousal Testi-
mnony, 28 BROOLYN L. REV. 259, 279-84 (1962); Note, Privileged Comnund-
cations Between Husband andT Wife in the District of Columnbia, 1 CATH.
U.L. REV. 9 (1950); Note, Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indi-
ana, 27 IND. L.J. 256 (1952); Note, Marital Evidentiary Privilege in
Minnesota, 36 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1952); Note, Evidence-Privileged
Communications Between Husband and Wife, 15 N.C.L. Rlv. 282 (1937);
Note, Privileged Communications-Some Recent Developments, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 590, 593 (1952); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107 (1929). This most modem
and widely recognized marital privilege has the sanction of statute in more
than forty jurisdictions. The statutes have been collected in 2 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940).
'2 WIGMORE § 2285.
1968]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The policy of the privilege 3 was expressed in State v. Brittain4
thusly:
The relation of husband and wife is confidential, from unity of in-
terest and sometimes unity of person, as in a case of joint estate
to them. The law requires and exhorts this confidence, and
it will protect it. Communications between them cannot be ex-
posed to public view. The interest of the home, the parties, the
children and especially the peace and order of society forbid it.1
The privilege embraces oral and written communications'0 but not
ordinarily acts.'1 It is applicable to a marital status only, i.e., com-
munications "during marriage."' Therefore, the privilege does not
apply to a communication between spouses living in separation, " or
between persons living in unlawful cohabitation, 20 since the relation is
not one in which the law wishes to foster confidence. The privilege
does not protect communications between man and woman before their
marriage," but once the privilege has arisen, it remains after termina-
tion of the marital relation by death 22 or divorce23 as to communica-
tions during marriage.
There is a split of authority among the states regarding which
spouse has the privilege and who may waive it.' Some courts feel
" WIGMORE § 2332; Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MNmN. L. IEv. 675, 680-82
(1929).
1 117 N.C. 783, 23 S.E. 433 (1895).
19Id. at 795, 23 S.E. at 433.
"Mercer v. State, 40 Fla. 216, 24 So. 154 (1898) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell,
80 Tex. 101, 15 S.W. 705 (1891).
" WIGMORE § 2337 (acts may be communicative in nature so some acts
may be covered by the privilege).
1 Whitford v. North State Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 233, 79 S.E. 501
(1913) held that a letter written by husband and received by wife after his
death not privileged, since communication was not made during marriage.
1" Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, 110 Me. 469, 87 A. 40 (1913); Contra,
People v. Oyola, 6 N.Y.2d 259, 160 N.E.2d 494, 189 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1959).
Oyola held privilege applicable where separation was short and communica-
tion was in nature of an attempted reconciliation.
" People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App. 2d 419, 332 P.2d 174 (1958) (privilege
does not apply where marriage is bigamous).
"United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943); Halbock v.
Hill, 261 F. 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1919); Forshay v. Johnston, 144 Neb. 525, 13
N.W.2d 873 (1944); Harp v. State, 158 Tenn. 510, 14 S.W.2d 720 (1929).
" See WiGmoRE § 2341 n.1 for numerous cases on this point.
- Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1960); Pereira v. U.S.,
202 F.2d 830, 834 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 570, 579 (1954) ; But
see, Coles v. Harsch, 129 Ore. 11, 276 P. 248 (1929).
2 WIGMOIE § 2340.
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that since the privilege is intended to secure freedom from appre-
hension in the mind of the communicator, he has the privilege, and
the addressee cannot object, unless the latter's silence is viewed as
an assent and adoption of the statement as his own.25 Under this
reasoning the communicating spouse alone has the privilege and he
alone may waive it.2 However, the general rule which existed at
common law is that communications made by one spouse to the
other in confidence of the marital relation are so protected that
neither spouse can disclose or can be required to disclose unless the
other spouse consents thereto and waives the privilege.2 7 Thus both
spouses have the privilege but neither can waive it without the con-
sent of the other.
The court in Hicks in considering the scope and meaning of this
privilege discovered what must be viewed as an aberration in North
Carolina law regarding who may claim the privilege and who may
waive it. In Hagedorn v. Hagedorn" the court permitted the wife
to testify to confidential conversations with her husband, over the
husband's objection.29 "Thus," one commentator has summarized,
"under this decision [the Hagedorn case] where one spouse con-
fides in the other, apparently both spouses are given a privilege not to
disclose the confidence, but either can waive it for both.""0 Until
the present case the North Carolina Supreme Court had no oppor-
tunity to reconsider this position, with the exception of an obiter
dictum in accord with the decision of the Hagedorn case." The
common law rule, i.e., that both spouses have the privilege and
neither can waive it without the consent of the other, is a direct con-
tradiction of the rule in Hagedorn. North Carolina recognized the
common law formulation of the privilege before it was written into
" WIGMAORE §§ 2338 par. (4), 2340. E.g., Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211
N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937); Contra, Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super.
498, 503, 83 A.2d 401, 403 (1951), note 10 supra.
" State v. Branch, 193 N.C. 621, 137 S.E. 801 (1927).
"Note 24 supra; State v. Freeman, 197 N.C. 376, 148 S.E. 450 (1929);
State v. McKinney, 175 N.C. 784, 95 S.E. 162 (1918); State v. Randall,
170 N.C. 757, 87 S.E. 227 (1915) ; State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 623, 78 S.E. 1
(1913); Toole v. Toole, 109 N.C. 615, 14 S.E. 57 (1891).
.211 N.C. 175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937).
STANSEURY § 60.
15 N.C.L. REv. 382, 285 (1937). This excellent note criticizes the
Hagedorn case stating that "In arriving at this result, the Court relied
solely upon one North Carolina case, [Nelson v. Nelson, 197 N.C. 465, 149
S.E. 585 (1929)] which is not in point, and a dictum of the Supreme Court
of the United States [Stickney v. Stickney, 131 U.S. 227, 236 (1899)]."
" Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 16, 116 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1960).
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the present statute. 2 In McCoy v. Justice,33 for example, a letter
written by the husband to the wife was held inadmissible without the
husband's consent even though the wife betrayed the confidence by
giving the letter to a third person. Note that the privilege did not
terminate when the third person received the letter.
If the court in Hicks had followed the Hagedorn decision, the
husband could have waived the privilege. The court did not expressly
overrule Hagedorn or the obiter dictum in accord, but simply held if
they were applicable to the facts then the court was inclined not to
follow them.3 The court apparently adopted the common law rule in
interpreting the statute but it is distressing that the court did not
expressly overrule the Hagedorn case which is a clear departure from
the statute.
The final issue in the case, i.e., whether the presence of a third
person, a child, during the conversations removed the veil of confi-
dence, had to be determined by the court. The essence of the privi-
lege is to protect confidential communications only.,5 The better
view appears to be that all marital communications are presumed con-
fidential, but it is a rebuttable presumption." According to the
reasoning of most courts, this confidentiality is destroyed when the
communication is made in the known presence of a third person.8 7
Also, since the privilege insures the communicating spouse only that
his confidences will not be disclosed without his consent in court by
" In State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. 108 (1838) the court said: "whatever is
known by reason of that intimacy [marriage] should be regarded as knowl-
edge confidentially acquired, and that neither [husband nor wife] should be
allowed to divulge it to the danger and disgrace of the other." Id. at 112.
199 N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452 (1930). See also, State v. Banks, 204 N.C.
233, 167 S.E. 851 (1933) where the court refused to allow cross-examination
of witness as to contents of letter written by him to his wife and delivered
by her to counsel to show bias. The contrary implication in State v. Branch,
193 N.C. 621, 137 S.E. 801 (1927) would appear to be an inadvertance.
" 271 N.C. 204, 207, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1967).
"Wigmore suggests that all marital communications should be presumed
confidential until the contrary is shown. WIGMORE § 2336. See also, Sexton
v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314 (1905); Comment, 4 ARK. L. REv.
426, 430 (1950).
" Id. Accord, R. WEINBERG, CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS 28 (1967).
"' WIGMORE § 2339. See also, Toole v. Toole, 109 N.C. 615, 14 S.E. 57(1891). Some cases have held that communications between spouses, al-
though made in the presence of a third person, are privileged. E.g., Mahl-
stedt v. Ideal Lighting Co., 271 Ili. 154, 110 N.E. 795 (1915). Some states
follow this rule on the ground that the disqualifying statute makes no ex-




the addressee,"8 an eavesdropper, unknown to the spouses, who over-
hears them, is not prohibited from making a disclosure.39 Conse-
quently, according to the great weight of authority, a communica-
tion, conversation, or transaction between husband and wife in the
presence of or overheard by a third person is not within the pro-
tection of the privileged communications rule.4" The majority
of courts allow the third person to testify, but courts disagree
whether the addressee may also testify. The logical rule would
appear to be that a communication made by one spouse to the
other in the known presence of a third person would not be
considered confidential and could be the subject of testimony by
the spouse to whom the communication is made; but that a com-
munication made by one spouse to the other in supposed privacy,
which is overheard by an eavesdropper would still be a confidential
communication and the addresse could not testify as to the communi-
cation. Yet the majority of jurisdictions do not seem to require that
the presence of a third person be known to the communicator in order
to render the testimony of a spouse regarding the communication ad-
missible. 1 "But," it has been noted, "the facts of the majority of
"8 Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 37 (1920); Commonwealth v.
Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918).
" State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950), supra note 10;
Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918) (homicide;
conversation between husband and wife in jail, overheard by dictograph, ad-
mitted); Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330, 96 S.W. 460 (1906);
State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (1862) (conversation overheard by witness who
was in the next room).
' WIGMOR § 2339. E.g., Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934);
Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737 (1913); Cowser v. State,
157 S.W. 758 (Tex. 1913). North Carolina has several cases speaking
to this point. State v. Freeman, 197 N.C. 376, 148 S.E. 450 (1929) is an arson
prosecution in which a third person was permitted to testify what he heard
husband tell wife at time of arrest. In State v. McKinney, 175 N.C. 784,
95 S.E. 162 (1918) a constable was allowed to testify that at the time of
arrest the wife told the defendant husband she had warned him against selling
whiskey and that he would get caught. State v. Randall, 170 N.C. 757, 87
S.E. 227 (1915) was a liquor offense in which conversations overheard
by a police officer were admitted. In State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. 1
(1913) eavesdropper unknown to spouses was allowed to testify to the con-
versation. In Toole v. Toole, 109 N.C. 615, 14 S.E. 57 (1891) a third person
was allowed to testify about what the husband said to the wife to show
adulterous intercourse as well as contradicting a previous witness. C.f.
State v. Brittain, 117 N.C. 783, 23 S.E. 433 (1895) where the wife was
forced by her husband to confess to him about incest, then forced by him to
confess to her mother; since the first confession was inadmissible, the second
confession was also excluded as stemming or proceeding from the first.
" Annot., 63 A.L.R. 107, 116 (1929).
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these cases show that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
them is that the presence of a third person was known to the hus-
band and wife.""
Members of one's family occupy the same position as strangers
in that their knowledge of a communication between spouses affects
the privilege of that communication. 43 Thus, if a communication is
made in the known presence of a member of the family,44 or is over-
heard by a member of the family,45 the veil of confidence has been
removed and the communication is not privileged.
In Hicks, a third person was present during the conversations,
but that person was a child. Does the presence of a child remove the
veil of confidence so that the husband could submit the recordings
in evidence? The answer to this question logically should involve
two additional problems: (1) evaluation of the competency of the
child to determine whether she may or may not be considered a
third person within the rule, and (2) if the child is determined com-
petent, whether the privilege is completely destroyed so that one of
the spouses may submit evidence concerning the conversations or is
destroyed only to the extent that the child could testify. Unfortu-
nately the court did not face either of these problems; it simply gave
its conclusions without any reasons. The court stated that it con-
strued the statute broadly and held that the husband and wife in-
tended their utterances to be privileged and that the "presence of
the eight-year-old daughter did not destroy the veil of confidence
thrown over these confidential conversations .... '4' Thus the court
held the tape recordings inadmissible and ordered a new trial.
Three problems faced the court and no satisfactory answer was
given to any of them. First, the court should have made its position
regarding the Hagedorn case explicit rather than saying it does not
apply to these facts. But the court did indicate that the other de-
421 Id.
'3 Id. at 118.
"In Taylor v. Winsted, 74 Ind. App. 511, 129 N.E. 259 (1920) a wife
was held competent to testify to statements made by her to her husband in
the presence of their sixteen-year-old daughter. Cowser v. State, 157 S.W.
758 (Tex. 1913) held that a wife may testify as to a conversation between
herself and her husband in the presence of her daughter.
' Linnell v. Linnell, 249 Mass. 51, 143 N.E. 813 (1924) held that when a
daughter was in a room 10 or 12 feet from room where wife made angry
statements to husband, the husband should be allowed to testify.
" 271 N.C. 204, 207, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1967).
[Vol. 46
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cisions since 18 38"' are uniform and that it would follow them.
The logical conclusion is that the rule in North Carolina is that both
spouses have the privilege but neither can waive it without the con-
sent of the other. Secondly, the court should have concerned itself
with the competency of the child. In North Carolina there is no fixed
limit below which a witness is incompetent to testify, but the witness
must understand the obligation of the oath and have sufficient intelli-
gence to give evidence."' North Carolina is liberal in allowing chil-
dren to testify; several cases have found children under seven years
old competent to testify.49 Previously courts have made the follow-
ing inquiries: Was the child of sufficient intelligence to pay attention
to, and to understand, what was being said? ° Was the child in-
terested in what was being said?51 Did the child pay attention to
or take any part in the conversation ?2 In the principal case the court
failed to make any such inquiries; however, the court stated at one
point in its discussion that the child was "'singing or playing in the
area' 3 during one of the conversations, thus possibly implying that
the child was not paying attention to or was not interested in what
was being said. The court made no further observations about the
child in respect to the other two conversations and nowhere referred
to the child's competancy. If the child was determined competent
as a third person, how could the spouses intend their conversations
to be confidential when making vile and profane statements in
" State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. 108 (1838).
48 STANSBURY § 55.
,McCurdy v. Ashley, 259 N.C. 619, 131 S.E.2d 321 (1963) (six-year-old
boy allowed to testify to events occurring nearly two years earlier) ; State
v. Gibson, 221 N.C. 252, 20 S.E. 51 (1942) (admitting testimony of five-year-
old, rejecting that of six-year-old, not abuse of discretion) ; See also, State
v. Harrington, 260 N.C. 663, 133 S.E.2d 452 (1963); Artesani v. Gritton,
252 N.C. 463, 113 S.E.2d 895 (1960); State v. Edwards, 79 N.C. 648
(1878).
'0 Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W. Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925) (thirteen-year-
old daughter held capable of comprehending what was said); Freeman v.
Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 130 N.E. 220 (1921) (nine-year-old child held not
of sufficient intelligence to comprehend conversation) ; Schierstein v. Schier-
stein, 68 Mo. App. 205 (1896) (infant child held incapable of comprehend-
ing).
gLyon v. Prouty, 154 Mass. 488, 28 N.E. 908 (1891) held that a four-
teen-year-old daughter would be interested when conversations concerned
seduction.
" Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897) held that the wife could not
testify as to a private conversation where the thirteen-year-old-daughter took
no part in the conversation.
271 N.C. 204, 207, 155 S.E.2d 799, 802 (1967).
1968]
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the presence of the third person? Thirdly, if the court had de-
termined the child competent as a third person, the problem of
whether both the child and husband could testify would arise. The
better view appears to be that the privilege is completely destroyed
as to a conversation made in the known presence of a third person
and therefore the husband should be allowed to testify via the tape
recordings. North Carolina follows the rule that the third person
either known or unknown to the spouses may testify, but whether
the spouse may in turn testify once the actual presence of a third
person has been established has not been decided. 4
A court should be zealous in protecting the privilege of con-
fidential communications which is intended to secure the perfect
confidence and trust which should characterize the relation of hus-
band and wife. However, the privilege protects only the institution
of marriage. It seems that the court in Hicks viewed the privilege
as covering the familial unit. The fact that the spouses intend their
conversations to be private and confidential seems immaterial when
spoken in the known presence of a third person, even if that third
person is a child. The court possibly considered the child such an
integral part of the marriage that she should not be considered a
third person. The real problem with the case is the failure of the
court to articulate the reasons for its decision, resulting in consider-




Multiple-party actions in the federal courts are susceptible to dis-
missal for want of jurisdiction because of the rule of complete di-
versity requiring that no plaintiff be a citizen of a state of which a
defendant is a citizen.- The jurisdiction of the federal courts over
suits "between citizens of different states"' seemingly contradicts
the basic tenets of federalism, for these suits involve rights grounded
"' Note 40 supra.
1 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
'28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1964).
[Vol. 46
